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GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING (GICHD)
The GICHD is an expert organisation working to reduce the impact of mines, cluster
munitions and other explosive hazards, in close partnership with mine action
organisations and other human security organisations. We support the ultimate
goal of mine action: saving lives, returning land to productive use and promoting
development. Based at the Maison de la paix in Geneva, the GICHD employs around
55 staff members from over 15 different countries. This makes the GICHD a unique
and international centre of mine action expertise and knowledge. Our work is made
possible by core contributions, project funding and in-kind support from more than
20 governments and organisations.
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SSS
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SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The scope of this guide aligns with International Mine Action Standard (IMAS)
09.60 and is intended to augment the general information provided in the standard.
Information in this guide applies to underwater explosive ordnance (EO) in the
territorial waters of a nation (generally within 12 nautical miles of shore) and
inland waters; this includes coastal waters, lakes, rivers, ports, harbours, ponds
and canals below the Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW) mark to a water depth of
50 metres or less. Clearance of areas deeper than 50 metres of water fall outside
humanitarian operations as defined in IMAS 09.60 due to the limited humanitarian
and socio-economic impact of deeper water sites.
This guide focuses on providing a collection of current policy and best practices
used in survey and clearance of underwater explosive ordnance. Specific cases are
used; they provide examples and analysis. It is not intended to be a comprehensive
database of policies and practices; it provides national authorities and mine action
organisations with guidance to better understand the issues and complexities of
underwater EO survey and clearance operations.

Scope and methodology

|

9

10

INTRODUCTION

In 2014, the GICHD conducted a survey of countries impacted by underwater
explosive ordnance (EO). Through examining documentation and direct contact
with national authorities, they found that EO affected a minimum of 64 countries.
Of these, 33 are developing nations who have requested assistance in mitigating its
impact. The mine action community will continue to encounter sites contaminated
with underwater EO; the policies and practices discussed in this guide will assist
in providing an understanding of the problems and potential solutions.

CURRENT UNDERWATER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE PROBLEMS
Underwater EO is located in inland waters, territorial waters and international
waters throughout the world. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) from sea
dumping after the First and Second World Wars, along with unexploded ordnance
(UXO) scattered in the littorals from dozens of other conflicts and wars, has
resulted in millions of tons of ordnance in global waters. Military air and naval
bombardments, naval mining operations, military firing ranges, sea-dumping of
munitions, ship and aircraft wrecks have all contributed to the problem. EO is a
direct hazard to coastal communities, maritime development, off-shore energy
industry, the commercial fishing industry, tourism and more. National militaries
have maintained, until recently, almost exclusive expertise in dealing with these
hazards. This guide shares policies and practices in order to disseminate these
largely unknown methods of underwater EOD operations.

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)

© ADF

UXO is ordnance that has been subjected
to an arming sequence but has failed to
explode. Typically, this occurs through
a normal firing sequence. A conserva
tive estimate is that modern ordnance
has a misfire rate of ten percent but
historically, a thirty percent misfire
rate was more common during the
world wars. Most UXO is from war.
War and resultant UXO have affected
most countries at one time or another. Figure 1 Australian CDT preparing explosive
Germany, France, United Kingdom, charges to dispose of UXO.
Japan and other countries still routinely
recover and dispose of thousands of tonnes of UXO each year from the Second
World War era. Firing ranges are another source of UXO. Bombing and artillery
ranges are common throughout the globe to prepare for war. As they become
12
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de-commissioned or abandoned, the UXO left behind remains a deadly hazard.
Progress has been achieved in clearing land-based UXO sites but underwater sites
have received less attention.

Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO)
AXO is also very common throughout
the globe. AXO is ordnance that may
or may not have been primed, fuzed,
armed or other wise prepared for
use. Sea dumping of ordnance was
a standard practice until the 1970s,
with most occurring immediately after
the Second World War. Dumping of
millions of tonnes of ordnance into
global waters took place during that
period. Ship and aircraft wrecks also Figure 2 Japanese depth charges in Koror
contain substantial amounts of AXO. Harbour, Republic of Palau.
Thousands of these wrecks remain
along coasts, in lakes and rivers. Some AXO sites are in deep water with little
hazard to coastal communities. Those in shallow coastal or inland waters result
in considerable humanitarian and socio-economic impact.

THE IMPACT OF UNDERWATER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE
The impact of underwater EO should
b e t h e p r i m a r y d e t e r m i n a nt o f
action required at contaminated
sites. Unfortunately, it is not widely
understood. This is primarily due to
underw ater ordnance being often
out-of-sight. Accessibility is normally
limited to those conducting activities
on or under the water. Assessments
should analyse those humanitarian,
socio-economic and environmental Figure 3 A GICHD advisor assisting Ukraine
factors which have an impact on EO with an impact assessment of underwater
sites. Assessments should be included areas along the Black Sea coast.
in the planning phase to determine if
impact warrants the time, risk and effort required to survey and clear the ordnance.
For sites with no or limited impact, it may be prudent to monitor the area until
Introduction
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changes require action. There are three main impact criteria: humanitarian, socioeconomic and environmental impact. Impact assessments should be conducted in
coordination with local authorities who can access information, reporting and records.

TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS
Organisations conducting underwater
EO survey and clearance include NGOs,
commercial organisations and military
forces. Each of these organisations has
knowledge and experience in certain
aspects of underwater survey and
clearance operations. Few, however,
understand the overall complexities
and the training and equipment
requirements needed. The following
paragraphs provide a basic structure
for categorising underwater EO and
determining needed resources.

Figure 4 A GICHD advisor conducting a

capability assessment of Ukraine SES divers.

There are many methods of categorising underwater EO but the categories
described below are useful when looking at training and equipment needed for
survey and clearance operations. Categories are different based on the ordnance’s
location (buried or protruding) and the water depth. In many cases, more than one
category will be relevant. For instance, underwater EO may be buried (Cat 2) in a
water depth of greater than 20 metres (Cat 3). In this case, training and equipment
requirements for both Category 2 and 3 will be required.

Category 1 underwater EO
Definition: underwater EO not buried
beneath the seabed and in less than 20
metres of water.
Generally, Category 1 underwater EO
can be surveyed and cleared using
manual search techniques with simple
diving systems. Burial of underwater
EO is dependent on seabed type and
environmental conditions at each site.
Some sites have very low burial rates,
14
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Figure 5 Manual survey and clearance

procedures being performed by Ukraine SES.

while at other sites the rate is very high. It is important for non-technical surveys
to assess burial rates in order to determine training and equipment requirements
for follow-on technical survey and clearance operations.

Main equipment requirements for Category 1 operations:
• Small boats suitable for scuba diving;
• Scuba or similar diving equipment
• Diver communication system
• Personal dive equipment (wet/dry suits, fins, masks, knives, etc.)
• Underwater search systems:
}}

Lines, clumps and buoys

}}

Underwater metal detector

• Maritime differential GPS
• Lift bags to recover EO
• Underwater demolition equipment
• Emergency medical equipment
• Geographic information system (GIS) to document survey and clearance

Basic training requirements:
• Basic dive training
• EOD level 1, 2 and 3 training
• Diving medicine and treatment
• Dive supervisor training
• Small boat coxswain training
• Marine navigation training
• Underwater search techniques
• Underwater demolition procedures
• Maintenance and certification of diving life support systems

Introduction
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Category 2 underwater EO
Definition: underwater EO buried below the seabed and in greater than one metre
of water.
It generally requires a technical survey with advanced sensors such as electro
magnetic induction (EMI) systems or magnetometers. Manual search techniques
are not effective in areas where underwater EO burial is high. EMI systems or
magnetometer survey systems map contamination in order to improve safety,
efficiency and effectiveness of operations.
Main equipment requirements for Category 2 operations:
• Small boats suitable for technical survey operations
• Maritime differential GPS
• Sonar (boat-towed or AUV)
• EMI system or Magnetometer (boat-towed or AUV)
• Underwater remotely operated vehicle (ROV) – optional
• Geographic information system (GIS) to document technical survey
• Software for conducting post-mission analysis

Basic training requirements:
• Technical survey system training (towed/AUV, sonar/magnetometer)
• Small boat coxswain training
• Marine navigation training
• Technical survey mission planning
• Post-mission analysis training (sonar, magnetic anomaly interpretation)
• Software training

Category 3 underwater EO
Definition: underwater EO located in greater than twenty metres of water depth or
in situations where ordnance is located inside the compartment of a shipwreck.
Category 3 underwater EO generally requires the use of advanced dive training and
equipment. A professional surface-supplied diving system and support equipment

16
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is required when conducting search and clearance work at a greater depth than
20 metres of water or within a shipwreck.
Main equipment requirements for Category 3 operations:
• Diving support vessel (typically 40 metres or more in length)
• Surface-supplied diving equipment
• Dive communications system
• Personal dive equipment (wet/dry suits, fins, masks, knives, etc.)
• Transportable diver recompression chamber
• Underwater search systems:
}}

Lines, clumps and buoys

}}

Underwater metal detector

• Underwater remotely operated vehicle (ROV) – optional
• Maritime differential GPS
• Lift bags or davits to recover EO
• Excavation equipment (pumps to dredge mud, sand and debris)
• Underwater demolition equipment
• Emergency medical equipment
• Geographic information system (GIS) to document survey and clearance

Basic training requirements:
• (all Category 1 training)
• Surface-supplied dive training
• Diving supervisor training – surface supplied diving
• Dive recompression chamber operations and maintenance
• Treatment of dive casualties

Introduction
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UNDERWATER SURVEY
AND CLEARANCE OPERATIONS

The approach described in this section derives from the principles and standards
developed in the mine action community. Tactics, techniques and procedures from
military underwater mine countermeasures (MCM) operations, and the currently
available technology, have been included in this guide.

RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
The framework outlined in Figure 6 displays the integration of risk management
into the overall mine action process for underwater EO survey and clearance
operations. The following paragraphs discuss each step of the risk management
process.

Identifying risks
Part of the General Mine Action Assessment includes a desk study of the history of
an underwater EO site. It should identify the underwater EO by providing a general
description of the location, type of EO and reason for its presence. Collected
information may come from national archives, military databases, war records,
range maps, records of disposal, vessel logs documenting activities, nautical
charts, sailing publications, records of previous incidents of recovered munitions,
public documents, databases developed by private researchers, the recreational
diving community and other relevant sources. This information will feed into a
more detailed study during a Non-Technical Survey (NTS).
Before progressing to a NTS, an impact assessment should be conducted to
determine if the risks identified justify further effort. An impact assessment analyses
humanitarian, social, economic and environmental risks of an underwater EO site.
For example, determining the likelihood of both encountering underwater EO at
a site and detonation of the EO with its consequences would provide authorities
with the information needed to decide whether resources, effort and operational
risk should be employed to survey and clear an underwater EO site. The threshold
for taking action is different based on the risk tolerance of the authorities involved.
An NTS should only proceed when authorities decide that they should expend
additional effort to reduce the impact of an underwater EO site. The ‘Non-Technical
Survey’ section of this guide describes it further.
NTS refers to on-site collection and analysis of data on the presence, type,
distribution and surrounding environment of EO contamination. This is used to
define better where EO is present, and where it is not. It should follow a desk
study by building on data and information to provide a more detailed view of the
problem. It will confirm whether there is evidence of a hazard, identify the type
20
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FIGURE 6

RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

Underwater EO
survey/clearance process

1. Identify risks

A. General mine action assessment

• Type of EO

• Desk study

• Condition of EO

• Review of policy, regulations and laws

• Quantity and density of EO

• Underwater EO impact assessment

• General EO location

• Capability assessment
• Select and prioritise areas for

Mine
action
phases

Planning

Risk management
process

survey/clearance

• Specify survey and clearance
requirements and responsibilities

2. Risk assessment

B. Non-Technical Survey (NTS)

• Probability of encountering

• Collect and analyse survey information

• Severity of impact
of underwater EO

C. Technical Survey (TS)

• Survey site to defined requirements

3. Develop risk response

D. Enabling activities

• Avoid, Transfer, Mitigate

• Develop capabilities and establish

or Accept

Preparation

underwater EO

funding

E. Operations

• Direct and manage work

• Remove and dispose of underwater EO

• Monitor and control work

• Monitor and inspect (quality assurance)

• Reassess risk

F. Closeout

• Monitor residual risks

• Inspect cleared sites (quality control)
• Clearance documentation
• Post-project review

Post-clearance

5. Monitor risks

Clearance

4. Control risks
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and extent of hazards and defines, as far as possible, the perimeter of the actual
hazardous areas without physical intervention. Sources of information include
police, military, hospitals, local authorities, fishermen, dive shops, etc. Information
from the desk study and the NTS feeds into the risk assessment process.

Risk assessment
The purpose of a risk assessment is to assess risks posed by underwater EO
based on the probability of a threat occurring and its potential severity. It should
be applied to both the underwater EO site and the secondary risks that arise
as a direct result of implementing a risk response (see next section). Hazards
at a site directly related to underwater EO may be beach-going, scuba diving,
dredging, port development, bridge construction, etc. Secondary hazards related
to mitigation operations may be small boat operations, towed magnetometer
survey, diving operations, ROV operations, in situ EO disposal, recovery and
transport of EO, etc. An example of a four-step risk assessment process is shown
below. It can be used to assess and mitigate underwater EO and the secondary
risks from implementing a risk response.
Example hazard activity: in situ EO disposal operations of scattered underwater
EO near a port facility.
Step 1: identify hazard (see matrix developed in step 4 below).
• Hazards are physical activities conducted on site.

Step 2: identify associated threats (see matrix developed in step 4 below).
• Threats are defined by historic evidence and likelihood of occurrence.

22
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Step 3: develop a risk assessment matrix

Risk assessment matrix
Probability
Frequency of occurrence over time
A

B

C

D

Effect of hazard

Severity

Likely

Probable

May

Unlikely

I

Damage to critical infrastructure,
equipment or environment;
death of personnel

1

1

2

3

II

Significantly degraded infrastructure,
equipment or environment; severe
injury of personnel

1

2

3

4

III

Degraded infrastructure, equipment
or environment; minor injury of
personnel

2

3

4

5

IV

Little or no impact to infrastructure,
equipment or environment; minimal
injury of personnel

3

4

5

5

3 Moderate

4 Minor

Risk assessment codes:

1 Critical

2 Serious

5 Negligible

Step 4: institute a risk mitigation strategy, then reassess (example below)

Hazard

Threat

Initial

Mitigations

RAC

Reassess
RAC

In situ EO
disposal

Damage to port facility
infrastructure by
underwater explosive
shock wave.

2(IIB)

Move ships and other
critical infrastructure out
of hazard area; ensure
pipelines are not within
hazard area.

4(IID)

In situ EO
disposal

Swimmers or divers killed
or injured by underwater
explosive shock wave.

2(IC)

Warn local community
of operations; coordinate
with local authorities;
establish cordon around
hazard area.

4(IID)

In situ EO
disposal

Damage to marine
environment (coral, fauna,
sea life, etc.)

3(IIIB)

Assess potential damage
area around each site to
determine if damage is
acceptable.

4(IIIC)

In situ EO
disposal

Marine mammals killed
or injured by underwater
explosive shock wave.

2(IC)

Establish cordon around
hazard area and designate
personnel to watch for
marine mammals.

4(IID)

Underwater survey and clearance operations
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After assessing all hazards in the four-step process, authorities should have a
clear understanding of the risk associated with both the underwater EO and the
secondary risk response options. With both the risk assessment and the impact
assessment complete, authorities are ready to develop a risk response.

Developing risk responses
An organisation’s risk tolerance, operational capability and available funding will
be the primary influence on risk response options. There are four basic options to
consider when developing a risk response:
1. Avoid risk by limiting activities at the underwater EO site. Avoidance is a

good option in areas that have little activity and no plans for development
or activities that would produce an intolerable risk.
2. Transfer risk by shifting responsibility to another organisation. For instance,

in an area planned for commercial development, underwater EO clearance
operations could be included in the commercial development project.
3. Mitigate risk by conducting underwater EO clearance operations.

Ideally, clearance is the best outcome because it removes the source of
underwater EO risk but clearance capability or available funding may limit
an organisation’s ability to conduct clearance.
4. Accept risk by putting reactive procedures in place to respond when

finding underwater EO. Risk acceptance is typical with residual contami
nation. Even in areas where underwater EO has been cleared a residual
risk of encountering EO will remain. It is common for marine dredging
operations to accept underwater EO risk when ordnance is smaller than
a specified diameter. Magnetometers or other detection technologies are
usually applied to detect EO during dredging, followed by pre-planned
response procedures to remove and dispose of the detected EO.
Authorities should analyse the following criteria when considering risk response
options:
a. humanitarian, environmental, social and economic impact data provided in

the impact assessment;
b. primary risk of the EO at the site;
c. secondary risks that arise as a direct result of implementing a risk response;
d. residual risk remaining after risk response;
e. available underwater EO survey and clearance capabilities;
f.		 funding available for clearance.
24
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Before developing a risk response, authorities should understand their organisation’s underwater EO survey and clearance capabilities or the costs associated
with contracting a commercial company to complete the work. In many instances,
an organisation’s capacity or the available funding may limit risk response options.
Authorities should use information from the impact and risk assessments to
develop an appropriate risk response. In some cases, the risks of conducting
clearance operations will outweigh the potential humanitarian, environmental,
social or economic benefits. However, it is possible to reduce operational risk to an
acceptable level when sufficient resources are available. Conversely, if authorities
decide to forego clearance, measures should be put in place to avoid or manage
the underwater EO site. Additional information about site management is included
later in this guide in ‘Underwater EO Clearance and Site Management’.

Control risks
Controlling risk involves directing and managing work by implementing risk
response plans, tracking identified risks and identifying new risks. The information
collected from work performance data enables routine risk reassessments to
improve the effectiveness of risk response plans continually. In some cases,
corrective action may dictate an alternative risk response.

Monitor risks
Residual risk is probable at most underwater EO sites; therefore, post-clearance
inspection of EO sites may be necessary. Residual risk is the risk remaining
following the application of ‘all reasonable effort’ to identify, define, and remove
underwater EO through non-technical survey, technical survey and/or clearance.
It is minimised when competent organisations follow approved procedures and
processes. It is possible to quantify residual risk by monitoring areas to identify
any incidents, accidents or evidence of missed items. Confidence in the clearance
process can be maintained through the results of such monitoring and areas
requiring improvement can be identified.
In the case of response plans that include avoiding or accepting the EO risk,
monitoring and active management will also be necessary. Authorities should
establish a safety perimeter around known underwater EO sites and prohibit
activities in the area that would adversely risk disturbing the EO.

Underwater survey and clearance operations
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LIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
The mine action community have developed well-established policies, practices
and guidelines to address liability over the last two decades. Liability considerations
apply as equally to underwater EO survey and clearance operations as for
traditional land-based clearance operations. Policies, standards and principles of
liability within mine action are outlined below.

Liability in the mine action community
Liability refers to any legal responsibility, duty or obligation that a country,
organisation or individual may have. A well-documented, transparent, evidencebased approach to underwater EO survey and clearance operations, which
demonstrates the application of ‘all reasonable effort’, provides the primary
mechanism for addressing questions of liability; authorities at all levels then can
have the confidence to make appropriate decisions. It is important that national
authorities develop policies that detail liability aspects, including transfer of liability
from the underwater survey and/or clearance organisations to government or local
communities when certain criteria have been fulfilled. The following principles
should apply:
a. Underwater EO contamination is firstly and ultimately a national responsibility.

National authorities should accept accountability and liability for victims
and areas impacted by underwater EO. This includes known, as well as
unknown, areas and areas that have been cleared and handed over to the
national authority or local population. An underwater EO survey and/or
clearance organisation is considered to be liable for injuries only when it is
directly and currently responsible for an affected area. Proof of the validity
of this claim will still be required on a case-by-case basis.
b. An agreement that details the underwater EO survey and clearance plan

implies that all stakeholders agree on the definition of ‘all reasonable effort’.
Identifying and quantifying these efforts will help to prevent disputes
related to liability issues.
c. If an underwater EO survey and clearance plan has been approved by a

government, then appropriate application of the principles by operators and
acceptance of handover by the national authority implies that the level of
risk of underwater EO contamination in the area after survey or clearance is
deemed tolerable by the government.
d. If an investigation shows that the agreed underwater EO survey and clearance

plan had been implemented appropriately and thus the organisation had
made all reasonable effort to ensure that the area was safe before handover,
26
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the organisation will, in principle, not be liable for missed underwater EO
contamination or accidents. Additional guidance on the conduct of
investigations is provided in IMAS 10.60.
e. National policy or contractual agreements should clarify liability for dealing

with items found after underwater EO survey and clearance.

Types of liability insurance
Evidence of appropriate levels of liability insurance during operations should
be obtained by organisations performing underwater EO survey and clearance
operations. A brief description of the types of insurance is provided below:
a. Professional liability insurance: provides indemnity for the insured

against loss arising from claims made for error, omission or negligent act
committed in the conduct of consultancy or contracted service.
b. Employer’s liability insurance: provides coverage to a business or

organisation for liability for employees in the case of work-related bodily
injury or disease. Underwater EO survey and clearance operations require
many types of work that involves risk. Employers should adequately insure
employees for risks involved in diving, explosive handling and disposal,
small boat operations and many other risks identified during the risk
management process.
c. Public liability insurance: provides protection against claims of personal

injury or property damage that a third party may have suffered. Policies to
address third party liability should detail:
1.

personal injury of a third party;

2.

damage to third party property and infrastructure.

Underwater liability considerations
Organisations must also understand liability consideration with respect to the
marine environment. Some issues include:
a. Marine mammals and protected marine species: marine mammals are

particularly susceptible to pressure resulting from an underwater explosion.
In many parts of the world, there is designated protection for marine mammals
and other species. Organisations must understand regulatory requirements
to comply with national and local policies to protect these species.
b. Marine pollution and damage to the marine environment: the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) delineates rights and
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responsibilities of nations in their use of global waters. It institutes guidelines
for business and the management of the marine environment and
resources. Article 192 generally obliges signatories to ‘protect and preserve
the marine environment’.
c. Underwater cultural heritage sites and human remains in ships and

aircraft: the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
(UNESCO) Convention for the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage
has established that ‘States Parties shall ensure that proper respect is given
to all human remains located in maritime waters’. It also states, ‘Activities
directed at underwater cultural heritage shall avoid the unnecessary
disturbance of human remains or venerated sites’. As the wrecks of ships
and aircrafts often still contain human remains they must be approached
with respect. This includes proper treatment of discovered human
remains and notification of local authorities for preservation and recovery.
Preservation of historic sites must also occur, to the greatest extent
possible, when balanced with the primary and secondary hazards of the
underwater EO.

Detailed discussions and agreements on risk and liability should take place
between underwater EO survey and/or clearance organisations, and national
authorities before commencing operations.

NON-TECHNICAL SURVEYS
General policies and procedures
The application of NTS methods to
underwater EO survey and clearance
may be more difficult than land-based
operations due to the dynamic nature
of the marine environment. IMAS 08.10
presents the basic NTS methodology
that should be applied but procedures
have to be adapted to the underwater
environment.
An NTS will confirm whether there is Figure 7 A GICHD advisor discussing
evidence of a hazard or not, identify underwater EO in Palau.
the type and extent of hazards and
define the perimeter of the actual hazardous areas, without physical intervention.
In addition to these general criteria, the humanitarian, environmental, social
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and economic impact of the underwater EO should be analysed to determine if
additional effort is necessary for clearance. In many cases, underwater sites do
not pose a significant hazard and management of them may not require clearance.
For example, an isolated underwater dump site with abandoned explosive
ordnance (AXO) may not pose a significant hazard or impact local communities
or development; therefore, the site should be monitored or managed instead of
expending clearance effort.
Another aspect of underwater NTS is the need to conduct a site survey.
Information collected will be critical for follow-on underwater technical survey
and clearance operations. Underwater operations are more complex and dynamic
that land-based operations. In addition to the standard information gathered during
a land-based NTS (see IMAS 08.10), information about annual weather conditions,
water depth, tidal fluctuations, sediment type, currents, underwater obstructions,
shipwrecks, bottom clutter, seasonal maritime activities, dangerous marine life,
endangered wildlife or marine life, historical sites, cultural sites, oil/gas pipelines,
ports, boat ramps and other infrastructure information should be collected. An
individual country or site will always need to develop more detailed requirements.
A non-technical survey:
a. assesses whether areas are contaminated by ERW, or to refine the limits

of previously reported hazardous areas;
b. cancels incorrect reports of EO;
c. identifies socio-economic and threat factors that may influence future

priority-setting;
d. collects information about accidents, the type and pattern of hazards,

water depth, bottom composition, marine life, ecological environment, local
infrastructure, the security situation and other factors that may influence
priority setting and method of following up with additional support.
A non-technical survey may further serve as a planning tool for future efforts
(i.e. technical survey and/or clearance).
The starting point of a NTS typically involves a desk study. Similar to a landbased NTS, information is analysed from sources such as historical records, police,
military, hospitals and provincial authorities. However, an underwater NTS must
also include information from local fishermen, dive shops, marine businesses,
coastal communities and others with knowledge of the area. Historical research
may also provide unique challenges; information is often located in nautical charts,
ships logs and other naval records.
Underwater survey and clearance operations
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The environmental conditions at the site, type of EO, method of delivery and
available information directly relate to the ease of defining and refining limits of
a suspect hazard area (SHA) or a confirmed hazard area (CHA). An example of
a relatively simple underwater NTS would involve an intact shipwreck in which
historical records document the EO cargo, nautical charts document the wreck,
and local authorities or marine businesses have evidence of the EO through
photographs or other documentation. Precise boundaries of a CHA can be
defined around the shipwreck or within specific compartments of the wreck
using this information. Aircraft wrecks, underwater EO dump sites and other AXO
sites can often be defined in a similar manner. There are problems, however,
when environmental conditions move or bury EO. Some environments, for
example, lakes, are static, while others, such as swift rivers, are very changeable.
Understanding the impact of environmental conditions on the EO is an essential
factor in some underwater NTS.
At battle or bombing sites, the NTS process may be less precise, thereby requiring
definition of a larger SHA or CHA . The typical NTS process of research and
surveying local communities, businesses and authorities will refine the hazard area.
However, organisations cannot expect the precision of land-based surveys in some
cases. The hazard area requiring technical survey and clearance can be further
refined by reducing underwater areas that would not be impacted by activities
planned for the site. For example, an underwater CHA at a river site may only
require technical survey and clearance around the area of a bridge construction
project. The portion of the CHA not cleared should be properly managed to ensure
hazardous activities are prohibited within the remaining CHA.
The case study presented below will illustrate the complexity of the underwater
NTS process and the need to adapt to the area impacted by underwater EO.
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CASE STUDY: CAMBODIA

© GWHF

1

Figure 8 Approximate locations of sunken supply vessels in the Mekong,

Tonle Sap, Sekong, Sesan and Sre Pok rivers.

Background

During the Vietnam War, ordnance supplies moved between northern and
southern Vietnam by rivers in eastern Cambodia. Between 1970 and 1975,
barges and boats carrying ordnance were often targeted and sunk.
In 2011, information provided by local authorities and a scrap metal hunter
led Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (GWHF) to the location of two
sunken boats on the Tonle Sap River near Kampong Chhang. GWHF was
able to pinpoint the location of the wrecks and in May– June 2011, salvage of
eleven metric tons of U.S. ordnance occurred. Following further research, they
found evidence of nearly two hundred such sites in the rivers of Cambodia.
1 Case study information is based on discussions with GWHF personnel and the report:
Non-Technical Surveys to Investigate the Level of UXO and Ordnance Contamination in
the Mekong, Tonle Sap, Sekong, Sesan and Sre Pok Rivers in Cambodia by Golden West
Humanitarian Foundation, Marcel Durocher and Heang Sambo, April 2015.
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The estimated suspect hazard area totalled approximately one billion square
metres. Based on available technology and operational limitations, a technical
survey of the entire area would have taken more than a decade to complete.
As a result, GWHF developed a NTS methodology to reduce the area required
for technical survey operations.
Successes
GWHF used NTS methodology between 2011–2015 along the Mekong,
Tonle Sap, Sekong, Sesan and Sre Pok rivers in eastern Cambodia. The first
stage of the process involved historical research to detail the problem and
understand the operations. Declassified U.S. military reports provided
bombing data and information on military operations. Research of news
articles and documentaries by correspondents was also undertaken. The desk
study provided valuable insight into when and where attacks took place
and how each of the belligerents sunk the vessels. The research identified
197 vessels sunk during the period with approximate locations but the
information was not yet accurate enough to reduce the size of the survey
area for the technical survey process.

GWHF then developed an interview process to obtain additional information
from villages along the shores of the rivers and from people earning their living
on the rivers. The most valuable information came from fishermen, itinerant
traders and scrap metal hunters. Individuals, who would have had direct
knowledge of the attacks during 1970–1975, were preferred for interview.
Through early interviewing experience, GWHF learned that a sampling density
of one interview per five-kilometre stretch of river was sufficient. Additional
interviews were conducted at approximately each kilometre to better define
the area of the sunken vessel after a positive response about a sunken vessel
was obtained. They found, after follow-on technical surveys, that information
from two or more interviews about a sunken vessel site produced very
accurate locations.
Based on the inability of vessels transporting equipment and supplies to
navigate in shallow waters some of the areas were reduced in size. In other
areas, interview-sampling density was lower because of the precise
information provided by scrap metal hunters. Many of the sunken vessels
and cargo were salvaged by Vietnamese scrap metal companies between
1982–1987 and again in 1997–2003 from the Tonle Sap, Mekong, Sekong
and Sre Pok rivers: approximately sixty to seventy vessels were recovered.
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Cambodian scrap metal hunters also salvaged some sites. In one instance,
Cambodian authorities apprehended local scrap metal hunters for illegally
salvaging ordnance from a barge on the Mekong River. Remaining ordnance
at the site (approximately 70 metric tons), along with two other sites, were
salvaged by government authorities and a private contractor. Salvage
operations by scrap metal hunters have reduced the amount of EO in the rivers
but the quality of clearance was unknown and the information management
process was non-existent.
NTS of the Cambodian rivers has resulted in the identification of 14 sites
where performance of technical survey operations is required. Technical
surveys and salvage operations are complete at some sites, while other sites
await the required technical equipment and expertise. Although the NTS
process has been effective at identifying wreck sites, there is a gap between
the 197 vessels identified in the desk study and the approximately 74–84
discovered during the interview process.
Challenges

The dynamic nature of the rivers and the quality of data available about the
location of the wrecks limited the accuracy and completeness of the NTS
data. The sinking of the smaller wooden transport vessels has contributed to
the discrepancy. These vessels were often destroyed much more easily than
metal boats, resulting in the remnants of the vessels and cargo vanishing
quickly. River sediment or flow either buried the scattered remains or washed
them down river. The evolution of the Mekong River also explains some of the
challenges. Several metres of sediment now bury munitions barges, which
have been sunk for forty years. In other areas, the path of the river has moved
up to 200 metres. As a result, some vessels are no longer located near the
rivers. This changing environment adds complexity and inaccuracy not seen
in land-based surveys. Although challenging, management of the process can
create the required results.
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Analysis
An underwater NTS is different from land-based NTS in a very significant way:
not all underwater sites contaminated with EO require clearance. For example,
munitions buried below ten metres of sediment along an isolated section of
the Mekong River would not be likely to make much of an impact on the local
communities. In such a case, the survey and clearance process would expose
personnel to unnecessary risk and waste time and resources. Before GWHF moved
to the technical survey phase, they would assess the impact of the underwater
EO at the sites identified.
Impact assessments are an important element in determining whether underwater
EO clearance is worth the risk. Diving and clearance of EO are highrisk operations.
There must be value in clearing the underwater EO, otherwise it would be more
prudent to leave it in place and manage the sites.

TECHNICAL SURVEYS
General policies and procedures
The underwater technical survey process and available technology has rapidly
evolved over the last decade. Commercial industry has made progress with
EO survey projects supporting marine industry such as wind farms and oil/
gas infrastructure. The military continues to make progress with naval mine
countermeasures technology. Programmes, projects and technology developed to
support military and commercial industry have enabled safe, efficient and effective
technical survey operations for the mine action community. However, the scale
and scope of military and commercial operations is often different from operations
conducted by the mine action community.
This guide will therefore use the GICHD underwater equipment trials completed
in 2015 to analyse best practices for the underwater technical survey process.
Equipment trials evaluated a select set of commercial equipment suitable for
underwater technical survey operations. In the following section, we will look
at the various sensors and platforms available then discuss a process to analyse
equipment needed for specific sites.
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Technical survey equipment
The technical survey phase of underwater survey and clearance operations is
often the least understood due to the technical nature of the work. Although there
are limited instances when technical surveys can be accomplished using manual
procedures (divers), it is more common that advanced sensors will be required.
This guide concentrates on technology appropriate for use in water depths of
50 metres or shallower. Typical sensors used in underwater technical surveys
include the following:
• Magnetometers: these, in varying configurations, are widely considered
the most effective sensor for detecting underwater EO. Its proximity to the

ferrous metal in the ordnance is the basis of its ability. Magnetometers can be
configured as a single sensor, a sensor array or in a gradiometer configuration.
For sites that contain non-ferrous EO or sites in which the magnetometer cannot
be deployed close enough to the seabed (due to obstructions or seabed profile),
then a different sensor may be more effective.
• Side-scan sonar (SSS): these are a

common tool used during the technical
survey process but are rarely used alone
to detect underwater EO. An SSS alone
may be effective for sites which contain
only large EO (such as sea mines) or EO
contained within shipwrecks.
• Multi-beam sonar: the multi-beam sonar

(or echo sounder) is mainly used to
obtain bathymetry. Sonars do not need
to be employed as close to the seabed
as other sensors; this allows mapping of
the depth profile and large underwater
obstructions at the site before employing
other sensors that must be close to the
seabed.

Figure 9 Technical survey team preparing

SeaQuest gradiometer for operation.

• Sub-bottom profiler (SBP): an SBP

provides a sonar image beneath the
seabed. To date, the technology has
limited applications in the underwater
survey and clearance process. SBPs are
only effective in very small survey areas
and the data alone is rarely adequate to
distinguish EO.

Figure 10 Deployment of a Klein 3000

side-scan sonar for a technical survey.
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• Electromagnetic induction (EMI): these systems (also known as pulse induction)

are common in land-based EO surveys but employing them underwater can
be more difficult. They are typically reserved for underwater sites that contain
ordnance encased in non-ferrous metal or in locations with shallow water where
manual survey is possible.
• Bore-hole magnetometers: these can be used in areas that require detection

of buried EO beyond the capability of other magnetometers. The sensor bores
through the seabed to detect buried EO within the area around each borehole.
The time and effort required in this process limits the applicability of borehole
magnetometers to very small areas.
• Optical/tactile: although less efficient and effective than other sensors, the eyes

and hands of divers have detected underwater EO for decades. The next section
discusses this further. Underwater cameras are also readily available. The most
common use of cameras or divers is to verify that anomalies previously detected
by magnetometers or sonar contacts are, in fact, ordnance.
• Other sensors: explosive and heavy metal sampling sensors are currently

available and being adapted for use in EO surveys. As technology evolves, more
efficient and effective sensors will become available.
Selection of the proper platform to employ the sensor is as equally important as
sensor selection. Typical platforms include:
• Divers. Divers are rarely selected as

the preferred ‘platform’ for the tech
nical survey phase. They can employ
many of the sensors described above
but their efficiency and the inherent
risk involved in diving would normally
limit extensive use during technical
survey operations. Surveying small
areas, shallow portions or a site would
be the most appropriate use of divers.
• Small boats or vessels. Use of small

boats and larger vessels to mount
or tow sonars, magnetometers and
other sensors through the survey
area is the most common platform
currently in use. Proper deployment
and navigation of the selected sensor
is the most challenging aspect with
small boats or other vessels.
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Figure 11 A scuba diver descending with

a Shark Marine Navigator with integrated
metal detector.
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• Autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV).
Where cost is not a concern, AUVs

would be a good option in a majority
of situations. AUVs are outfitted with
multiple sensors; SSS, multi-beam sonar,
SBP, video cameras are all common and Figure 12 Iver3 AUV by Ocean Server.
magnetometers have recently been
added to selected AUVs. Reduced logistics requirements, improved navigational
capabilities and efficiency are just some of the positive aspects of AUVs over
other platforms. An AUV would not be effective in some environments, such as
some rivers with swift currents.
• Remotely-operated vehicles (ROV).

These provide a structure for cameras,
sonars and, in some cases, magnetom
eters. They can limit the need for divers
by verifying that anomalies detected
by other survey systems are actually
EO. The case study will discuss the
verification process. ROVs are also a
great tool for exploring hazards inside
shipwrecks or other ‘enclosed spaces’
which pose a significant safety risk to
divers. ROVs provide a great option for
reducing risk and improving efficiency
although they are not typically used
as the sole platform in technical survey
operations.

Figure 13 A Seabotix vLVB 300 ROV

being deployed.

• Other platforms. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) could be particularly useful

in surveying the surf zone and areas less than one-metre water depth. Sensor
packages are currently in development for this type of work. It is important to
be aware of developing technology that can make operations more efficient
and effective.
The sensors and platforms discussed in this section must be integrated into a
system that includes accurate navigation and data collection capability. Maritime
Differential Global Positioning Systems (DGPS) typically provide the required
sub-meter accuracy for navigation. Satellite-based augmentation systems (SBAS)
are also widely available. Another primary component of the technical survey
system is the software required to collect and analyse data. It is common to
use different software programmes for each type of sensor used. For example,
magnetometer data is commonly processed and analysed by a different software
Underwater survey and clearance operations
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programme than the one used for sonar data. Software companies are making
strides in providing an all-in-one solution capable of processing, analysing and
displaying the data collected from the technical survey systems. There is not,
however, a programme that currently stands out which has that capability.

Figure 14 Marine Magnetics Explorer magnetometer towed behind an Iver3 AUV with SSS.

Selection of technical survey equipment is dependent on site characterisation.
A particular sensor may be suitable at one site but not suitable at another; the
same principle applies to platforms. For example, a relatively small area, such as a
site for bridge construction, can be effectively surveyed using divers with handheld
metal detectors (as long as the detector has the required detection capability). In
an area that is much larger with deeper water, such as a coastal firing range with
unexploded ordnance (UXO), boat-towed systems with sonars and magnetometers
would be more appropriate. Assessing equipment requirements and selection of
suitable equipment is crucial to a successful technical survey.
Training and support requirements for technical survey operations can be
significant. Diving, small boat operations, analysis of sonar and magnetometer
data, equipment maintenance, etc., often require months or years of training
to become proficient. Operational safety, efficiency and effectiveness will be
compromised without proper equipment, training and support.

38

|

Underwater survey and clearance operations

CASE STUDY: GICHD UNDERWATER EQUIPMENT TRIALS  
2

Background

In March 2015, the GICHD sponsored an Underwater Equipment Demon
stration Trial to evaluate available commercial technology suitable for use in
underwater technical surveys. The trial assessed sonar, magnetometer and
optical sensors mounted on AUV, ROV, boat-towed and diver systems in water
depths of 0–50 metres. Selected systems were deployed in two 100 metre by
200 metre ranges with eleven simulated EO targets between 2 to 8 inches in
diameter for each range. Although the demonstration was relatively limited,
the technology and methodology used provided important information about
available sensors and platforms for technical surveys.
Demonstrations and evaluations took place of the following systems:
• An AUV with a high frequency side scan sonar, combined with inter

ferometric bathymetry and a total field magnetometer.
• Multi-sensor gradiometer magnetometer towed by a small boat.
• Diver underwater navigation system. This system reacquired and

identified previously detected targets to verify that they were the simulated
EO targets. It was not used for initial detection or ‘area survey’.
• ROV with a high frequency scanning sonar and video camera. As with

the diver navigation system, the ROV reacquired and identified the
simulated EO targets.
The full report is available on www.gichd.org
Successes

As has been demonstrated in other studies and operations, magnetometers
provided the best sensor for locating individual EO during an underwater
technical survey. Demonstrations of a boat-towed gradiometer and an
AUV-towed magnetometer took place during the trial; both systems produced
2 Case study information is based on author participation in the equipment trials and the
report: Technology Demonstration Report for Underwater Survey Equipment in support of
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) Technical Survey Operations, Revision 1.0, 12 November
2015, Prepared by Orca Maritime Inc. The report is available on the GICHD website.
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nearly identical results. During the ordnance identification phase, ROVs
were more efficient and effective than the diver system in reacquiring and
identifying the targets, particularly in water deeper than 20 metres. ROVs
required significantly fewer logistics and less set-up time and maintenance
than the dive systems, and the ROVs could remain at depth for significantly
longer periods.

Figure 15 Results of an underwater magnetometer survey. The graphic on the left

displays processed magnetometer data. The centre graphic displays the analyst
marks of anomalies resembling EO. The right graphic overlays the marks of the actual
location of the simulated EO planted in the test range for the equipment trials.

Standard methodology and mission planning details were also validated and
established during the event. Technical surveys are normally conducted in
two distinct phases. The first phase is to Survey, Classify and Map (S/C/M),
followed by the Reacquire and Identify (R/I) phase. Usually The S/C/M phase
is conducted using platforms that can cover a large area in a relatively short
period. These broad-area surveys are best suited to boat-towed or AUV
systems. Data is collected on the entire area by boats or AUVs methodically
deploying sensors at a specified height-above-bottom and distance between
search lanes (similar to the process of mowing a lawn). Once data from the
sensors is processed and analysed by appropriate software systems, magnetic
anomalies or sonar contacts are classified as either meeting the characteristics
of the suspect ordnance or not.
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The contacts of interest (COI) are then
mapped and made available for the
follow-on R/I phase. In this case, the
latitude and longitude coordinates
were passed to divers and ROVs.
Divers used an underwater navigation
system, sonar and their vision to
reacquire and identify the COIs. The
diver system also had the capability of
photographing the ordnance for data
Figure 16 Shark Marine Navigator
collection purposes. ROVs use sonars
multi-function display.
and cameras for the same purpose
but obviously do not require a diver.
The R/I phase is not always required during technical survey operations. If data
collected during the S/C/M phase is of high enough quality, the R/I process
can wait until clearance operations commence. This process is important to
understand and the report contains a full explanation3.
Challenges

The GICHD underwater equipment trials highlighted several challenges in
the technical survey process. Primary among them were the limitations of
sonars, the constraints of diver systems and the complications of conducting a
technical survey in areas with a large amount of metallic debris. Understanding
these challenges is important in both the selection of systems and application
of the systems in the technical survey process.
Sonars are important sensors to most underwater technical survey operations
but they are not normally effective in detecting individual EO. Sonars use
sound waves to create images of the area. These images are then analysed
to find objects that resemble the size and shape of EO or other relevant
contacts. The equipment trials found that sonar, by itself, would be ineffective
in detecting EO less than six inches in diameter. The inability of most sonars
to locate buried EO (an SBP can detect EO but only in very limited scenarios)
is another key limitation. Sonars are, however, very effective and efficient
at finding larger EO, AXO sites, shipwrecks and obstructions. Sonars also
provide important bathymetry and other data needed for planning the

3 See the GICHD Underwater Equipment Demonstration report.

Underwater survey and clearance operations

|

41

collection of technical survey data for other sensors, such as magnetometers.
Understanding the technical capability and limitations of sensors is critical to
a successful underwater technical survey.
The employment of divers, whether in
the technical survey process or during
clearance, requires an understanding
of the associated risk and limitations.
Diving involves inherent risks;
decompression sickness, arterial gas
embolisms, and dangerous marine
life are just a few of these. Their
equipment and physiology limit divers.
For example, a SCUBA diver may have Figure 17 Scuba diver using a Shark
enough breathing air in a cylinder to Marine Navigator system.
dive for ninety minutes at a water
depth of twenty metres but the diver’s physiology is limited to one hour due
to the risk of decompression sickness. There are also limitations for exposure
to cold or heat.
During the GICHD underwater equipment trials, diving had to be significantly
abbreviated because some divers could not Valsalva (or clear their ears)
in order to descend to the seabed. Some divers were also seasick and
supervisors were concerned about diving in the moderate weather conditions.
To improve the safety, efficiency and effectiveness of underwater survey
and clearance operations, it is often better to use systems that do not
require divers, when practical. When divers are required, proper training and
equipment is essential prior to commencing operations.
The overall purpose of an underwater technical survey is to detect and map all
EO in a specified underwater area. This process can be particularly difficult in
former conflict areas and firing ranges with metallic debris strewn throughout.
Analysis of magnetometer data can filter some of the debris by eliminating
magnetic anomalies that are outside the signature of expected EO at the
underwater site. Other magnetic anomalies can be eliminated through analysis
of sonar data. A problem arises, however, after filtering the technical survey
data, when a significant number of non-EO COI remain. Understanding the
cause of false alarms and the means to reduce false alarms is essential to a
successful underwater technical survey.
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The challenges highlighted in the GICHD underwater equipment trials are all
manageable:
a. sonars are necessary sensors for technical surveys but they are rarely

effective by themselves
b. diving operations involve risk but the risk is manageable with proper

training and equipment, or by limiting risk by using ROVs
c. factors affecting the false alarm rate must be understood in order to

produce a high quality technical survey. The technical survey process
can be difficult but proper training, equipment and expertise will
produce the required results.

Analysis
A standard concept of operations (CONOPS) for underwater technical surveys
can be developed through analysis of the GICHD trials. Through a thorough
understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each sensor and platform,
a process can be developed to employ the systems in the most effective and
efficient manner.
Results of a NTS will provide fundamental details to begin development of a standard
CONOPS for the technical survey process. At a minimum, the NTS should provide
details such as type of EO in the hazard area, size of area, water depth and other
environmental details. From these details, it is generally possible to select the
appropriate sensors and platforms for the technical survey. In the GICHD underwater
equipment trial example, two separate areas were used to simulate firing ranges with
scattered UXO between 2 inches to 8 inches in diameter. The first survey area was
located in the inner waterways with a silt and sand seabed in 1 to 5 metres of water
depth. The second survey area was located in coastal waters with a sand seabed
in 5 to 50 metres of water depth. Based on this limited information, it is possible to
develop a CONOPS for the technical survey, with the following phases:
Phase 1: Broad sonar survey to collect bathymetry and map obstructions.
• A ‘high-pass’ with a sonar is often a needed step prior to deploying

sensors close to the seabed. Without this information, it is likely that survey
equipment would foul during phase 2 operations.
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Phase 2: Magnetometer and detailed sonar survey to detect and map EO.
• In this scenario, a sonar alone would not be effective in detecting the EO

because of the small size of the EO and likelihood of burial. Combining
magnetometer and sonar data provides a higher confidence in the COIs
detected by both sensors.
Phase 3: Reacquire and identify COIs with ROV to verify that they are EO.
• This reduces the effort and risk required during follow-on clearance

operations by reducing the number of false alarms.
At the end of the technical survey process, bathymetry, sonar, and magnetometer
data should populate a GIS along with video/photographs of the hazard areas.
The analysed data will provide a list of COIs with relevant data for clearance
operations.

UNDERWATER EO CLEARANCE AND SITE MANAGEMENT
General policies and procedures
The process of underwater EO clear
an c e invo l ve s mu c h m o r e t h an
simply understanding procedures for
ordnance disposal. Before deciding
on the most appropriate action in an
area contaminated with underwater
EO, a detailed knowledge of local
regulations and the under water
ecosystem is required. Local, regional
and international policies, regulations
and standards may limit options
available for clearance. Underwater
environments often contain rare or Figure 18 Ukraine Special Emergency Services
endangered marine life, historical sites, scuba diver recovering AXO in the Black Sea.
war graves, sensitive infrastructure or
other concerns. Planning should take these into account. Options to mitigate
the EO may then be reduced. There are two general choices available for sites
with underwater EO: clear the EO, or leave the EO in place and manage the site.
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Clearance options
Clearing under water EO has two
options available: dispose of EO
in situ, or recover EO for disposal at an
alternate location. In situ disposal tends
to be the safest option to minimise risk
to personnel but it also has the greatest
impact to the surrounding environment.
The process involves initiating an
explosive counter-charge next to the
EO on the seabed. The underwater
pressure wave from the explosion can
cause secondary damage to marine
life (particularly marine mammals),
infrastructure and other underwater
objects in the immediate vicinity.

Figure 19 Vietnamese military team

recovers EO at bridge construction site.

When the risk to the surrounding environment is too great, it may be acceptable
to recover the EO from the seabed for disposal at an alternate location. The
process of recovering EO is ordinarily conducted by divers using various recovery
techniques, such as: attaching a line to the ordnance and pulling it to the surface,
floating the EO with a lift bag, use of cranes and barges, and even the use of
industrial magnets in limited situations. Once recovered, the EO is transported
to an alternate location for disposal. The problem with this option is that more
risk is assumed by EOD personnel handling the ordnance. EO that has been fired
or otherwise subjected to an arming sequence (UXO), or EO with sensitive main
charges may be too hazardous to be handled by personnel. Assessment of the
threat and risk of underwater EO should be conducted by underwater EOD experts
in consultation with local authorities. For situations in which clearance is not safe
or practical, site management options should be considered.
Site Management options
There are many instances when the relatively limited impact of underwater EO in
an area does not justify the associated risk of clearing the ordnance. There are also
times when funding is not available or regulations do not support underwater EO
clearance. In these cases, site management would be the only remaining option.
The process generally involves marking the area on nautical charts, restricting
activities such as fishing, dredging and development and periodic monitoring
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of the site to reassess the threat and risk. The SS Richard Montgomery, sunk in
the Thames Estuary, is a well-known example of an underwater EO site that is
managed in this manner. Germany is also known to manage many underwater
AXO dump sites. In Kiel, underwater AXO sites are routinely mapped with sonar
to monitor the location and condition of the ordnance. Germany also moves
underwater EO from shipping channels and ship anchorages to some of the
designated underwater dump sites that originated after the Second World War.
Another option is to accept the risk of underwater EO. As discussed in the
section on risk, marine dredging typically accepts the risk of ordnance smaller
than a specified diameter during operations. Ordnance detection and response
procedures are actioned, in this option, to remove and dispose of found EO.

CASE STUDY: OPERATION RENDER SAFE  
4

Figure 20 RENDER SAFE operation area.

Background

Advanced militaries have long maintained capability to survey and clear under
water EO. NGOs and commercial organisations have only recently begun
underwater clearance operations. In many cases, advanced military forces still
provide the most effective capability for clearance. Training and experience
4 Case study information is based on discussions with Royal Solomon Islands Police
Force EOD teams and ADF personnel.
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required of clearance divers can be extensive and require several years to
develop a robust capability. Investment in such a capability is often reserved
for military forces.
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) leads an ongoing multinational force
operation every year in the Pacific islands to support EO clearance originating
from the Second World War. The operation, entitled RENDER SAFE, includes
military support from the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand,
Canada and the Solomon Islands (SI). RENDER SAFE commenced in 2009
and has included deployments to Nauru in October 2010, Solomon Islands
in November 2010 and 2013, Vanuatu during January to February 2011, and
Papua New Guinea, first in Rabaul, from October to November 2011, then
on the Kokoda Track in October 2011, and finally in the district of Torokina in
2014. The operation has cleared hundreds of sites and disposed of tens of
thousands of ordnance items. This case study includes details and discussion
of the operation conducted in the Solomon Islands in 2013.
From 28 October to 6 December 2013,
Operation RENDER SAFE completed EO
clearance activities on Guadalcanal,
Tulagi Harbour and Russell Islands in
areas identified by the SI government.
Operations were partnered with the
Royal Solomon Islands Police Force
(RSIPF) EOD teams. This partnership
assisted in overcoming language
gaps and provided enhanced local
knowledge on ordnance problems and
disposal techniques. 12,164 explosive
items with a net explosive weight of
6,851 kilograms were cleared during
the period.

Figure 21 RSIPF using a mobile cutting

system to cut ordnance before disposal
in a burn pit.

Successes

Underwater EO clearance operations during RENDER SAFE in 2013 were
successful in many aspects. The primary achievement was making SI
communities safer through the removal of ERW. The operation also provided
valuable capability development opportunities for RSIPF EOD teams. The RSIPF
became aware of the training and equipment required to conduct underwater
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clearance and was able to obtain
support from the U.S. to fill some of
their needs. The U.S. Department of
Defense Humanitarian Mine Action
(HMA) programme provided RSIPF
with scuba diving equipment and
training. More recently, the HMA
programme provided technical survey
equipment and training. RSIPF EOD
teams have proven their capability.
As a result, they have been invited by
ADF to support future RENDER SAFE
operations throughout the region.

Figure 22 In situ disposal of underwater

EO during Operation RENDER SAFE.

© ADF

The ADF also demonstrated proficiency in coordinating multinational
force participation in the operation.
Although ADF encountered difficulties, it is unlikely that a non-military
organisation could have coordinated
the planning, operations and logistics
required to support such an extensive
clearance operation. In some cases,
underwater clearance operations are Figure 23 Scuba divers preparing disposal
more challenging in the Pacific region charges during Operation RENDER SAFE.
due to remoteness and limitations
with logistics. However, even in more accessible areas, substantial coordination must take place in order to safely and effectively conduct operations.
The ADF used their wide-ranging resources to provide medical support to
diving and explosive operations, recompression chambers for diving casualties in case of an emergency and, most importantly, EOD experts to ensure
EO disposal operations protected personnel, property and the environment.
Throughout the operation, the ADF provided the required leadership to safely
and effectively coordinate and manage activities.
Australian Clearance Dive Teams (CDT) primarily conducted the underwater
EO clearance activities of RENDER SAFE. The CDT disposed of the EO in situ,
recovered the EO for disposal at an alternate location, or, in rare
circumstances, moved the underwater EO to deep-water dump sites.
The CDT are highly experienced. Their knowledge and experience in
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diving, demolition and EOD oper
ations allowed them to rapidly
assess and select the proper
disposal method based on a risk
a n a l y s i s f r a m e w o r k . Tr a i n i n g ,
experience and professionalism of
advanced military forces and similar
government organisations establishes
a standard for underwater clearance
tasks; anything less could result
in unacceptable risk to operations
and surrounding communities.

Figure 24 Transportation of bombs

recovered during Operation RENDER
SAFE to an alternate disposal location.

© iMMAP

Challenges

Figure 25 Heat map representing ERW in the Pacific from the Second World War.

A common challenge to RENDER SAFE operations is the time and effort
expended on the NTS process once forces have arrived on site. ADF relied
heavily on the SI government to identify sites with EO contamination. It would
be more efficient to complete the NTS process before deploying an entire
RENDER SAFE contingent. Allocating personnel to complete a NTS during
the scheduled reconnaissance phase or site survey, will provide more defined
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areas for clearance and enable a more efficient use of resources when
clearance teams are available.
For decades, the Pacific has had a problem with information management for
EO clearance. Clearance operations have taken place throughout the Pacific
islands since the end of World War II yet documentation has seldom been
undertaken. CDTs expended time and effort during RENDER SAFE searching
for underwater EO at sites with known contamination, only to find out that
other military clearance teams had previously cleared the areas. Clearance
data collected during Operation RENDER SAFE is also only accessible to
the ADF. A regional IM system at the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat was
proposed on several occasions but has not yet been put in place or funded.
Inefficient duplicated clearance operations will continue until a regional IM
system is instituted.

Analysis
Risk to personnel, property and environment is greater in the clearance phase
than in the previous survey phases. As a result, the requirement for adequate
training and equipment is critically important. Diving operations are often a
requirement for underwater EO clearance; even basic scuba dive training involves
a substantial commitment of time and resources. Advanced dive training and
support requirements are more onerous. Extensive investment in training and
equipment is required for small boats or larger vessels. EOD procedures normally
conducted on land become much more difficult underwater. Special training is
needed for explosive demolition materials, equipment and procedures. These
few examples highlight the commitment required to develop and maintain teams
proficient in underwater EO clearance operations.
An analysis must be conducted to determine whether that country should develop
their own underwater EOD capability or contract a commercial company for
clearance, when there is extensive underwater contamination in their waters.
Development of this capability is a significant process that could take up to a
decade and a large amount of funding to mature to full capability (See section on
Training and Equipment Requirements). A capability development programme is
generally the best option when a country already has a capability for underwater
EO clearance and only advanced training or equipment is required. Commercial
underwater clearance can also be very expensive but clearance can be relatively
quick and efficient if funding is available.
50
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CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Underwater survey and clearance of EO can be a difficult and expensive task.
Solving underwater EO problems in vastly different areas cannot be achieved
through a one-size-fits-all approach. Assessment of an area’s problem, along with
evaluation of the required capability for survey and clearance, will be useful in
developing a plan to progress operations. As technology changes and capabilities
mature, more options will become available although current choices are limited. A
few mine action non-governmental organisations (NGO) have explored underwater
EOD operations; commercial companies have made remarkable progress with
technical surveys; and government organisations generally maintain the most
capable clearance capacity. However, a single organisation with a full-range of
capabilities is rare.
The mine action community has developed and mastered the NTS process through
decades of clearing landmines and other explosive ordnance. Organisations
with such detailed knowledge and experience, combined with underwater EOD
experts, would be best suited to complete an NTS for areas with underwater EO.
Commercial organisations are capable in undertaking desk studies and militaries
often have access to databases with information required during the NTS process.
However, mine action organisations are generally more proficient in on-the-ground
NTS activities. Applying the NTS approach to underwater operations provides an
opportunity to improve efficiencies.
In recent years, the offshore energy industry has significantly progressed tech
nology suitable for use in underwater EO technical surveys. Companies have
since used sonars and magnetometers to detect and map EO in coastal waters,
rivers and lakes in support of commercial development activities. The technology
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continues to mature and commercial organisations have often maintained an
advantage in providing the most efficient and effective systems and processes
for underwater TS operations.
Advanced military and government organisations continue to be best suited to
clearance tasks. Extensive training, equipment and support requirements for
underwater clearance require investment and commitment that is difficult to
establish and maintain outside of government organisations. There are some
commercial bodies with clearance capabilities but most fully capable underwater
EOD teams are organised, trained and funded through government resources.
Understanding and applying experience from the mine action community,
commercial industry and advanced militaries is key to the development and
implementation of a successful underwater EO survey and clearance programme.
Whether planning to develop a capability within a government organisation or
simply contract a commercial business for the work, underwater operations will
require a considerable investment. Before deciding on a solution, it is best to have
an expert assess the underwater EO areas to provide advice and recommendations
for future survey and clearance tasks.
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ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
• Technology Demonstration Report for Underwater Survey Equipment in

support of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) Technical Survey Operations.
(rev 1.0)
Author: Orca Maritime Inc.
Publisher: GICHD
Date of publication: November 2015
• Assessment and Management of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Risk in

the Marine Environment.
Author: Cooper, N and Cooke, S
Publisher: CIRIA
Date of publication: September 2015
• Unexploded Explosive Ordnance (UXO) and Munitions Diving (Z275.6-11).

Publisher: Canadian Standards Association
Date of publication: August 2011
• A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge – Fifth Edition.

Publisher: Project Management Institute
Date of publication: 2013
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Additional resources

• IMAS 07.11 Land release
• IMAS 07.30 Accreditation of demining organisations and operations
• IMAS 08.10 Non-technical survey
• IMAS 08.30 Post-clearance documentation
• IMAS 09.11 Battle Area Clearance (BAC)
• IMAS 09.30 Explosive Ordnance Disposal
• IMAS 09.60 Underwater Survey and Clearance of Explosive Ordnance
• IMAS 10.20 S&OH – Demining worksite safety
• IMAS 10.70 S&OH – Protection of the environment
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